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ON RESPONSIBILITY AND ORIGINAL SIN:  
A MOLINIST SUGGESTION
Mark B. Anderson
A crucial objection to the doctrine of original sin is that it conflicts with a 
common intuition that agents are morally responsible only for factors under 
their control. Here, I present an account of moral responsibility by Michael 
Zimmerman that accommodates that intuition, and I consider it as a model of 
original sin, noting both attractions and difficulties with the view.
The Christian message begins with one’s recognition of deep failure as a 
moral and spiritual agent. It continues to include hope for one’s moral and 
spiritual restoration. Christian doctrine generalizes over these features, in 
such a way that all of us can recognize our failure and identify a source 
of hope.
But the Christian doctrine targeting the first feature—the doctrine of 
“original sin”—might do more to undermine than to promote our recogni-
tion of deep moral failure. The doctrine, in its original Augustinian form, 
has two components: what are sometimes called “original guilt” and “orig-
inal inclination.” Original guilt is the idea that all of us come into the world 
already morally blameworthy (perhaps for Adam’s sin). Original inclina-
tion is the claim that we are now constituted in such a way that we are 
prone to err, and thus are likely (perhaps bound) to sin during our lives.1 
One of the results of the doctrine thus construed is to increase the scope 
of sin so that (almost) all persons fall under its dominion and thus are in 
need of redemption. But a second consequence is that the Christian mes-
sage on blameworthiness or “guilt in the eyes of God” seems to clash with 
our understanding of moral responsibility. How can we be deserving of 
condemnation before we even develop as moral agents? And how is it just 
to blame us in virtue of how we behave when endowed with a distorted 
constitution, a constitution we inherited from the beginning of our lives?
applyparastyle "fig//caption/p[1]" parastyle "FigCapt"
applyparastyle "fig" parastyle "Figure"
1I prefer the language “original inclination” in order to distinguish it clearly from original 
guilt. But those who write on this topic usually speak of it as a deeply damaging wounding 
of the fabric of our constitution, not as a mere surface-level aberration in our desires.
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Several writers on this subject have attempted to refine the doctrine of 
original sin in order to preserve the first (presumably welcome) conse-
quence while avoiding the second (unwelcome) consequence. They have 
been far from uniform in their strategy, but one frequent suggestion has 
been simply to abandon the deeply counterintuitive notion of original 
guilt, while preserving original inclination, noting that even libertarianly 
free agents, thus inclined, will inevitably sin at some point during the 
course of their lives.2 Variations on this theme are common enough that 
it might be called the “new Augustinian normal,” although of course it is 
far from a consensus opinion among mainstream Christian philosophers.3 
My own suggestion, by contrast, is to invert this proposal, and to main-
tain original guilt in particular. (I have no recommendation regarding 
original inclination.) Perhaps paradoxically, the very concern about moral 
responsibility which leads us to oppose original sin, when expressed in its 
strongest form, gives us reason to accept the most (initially) counterintui-
tive component of the doctrine.
In what follows, I will present that objection in a strident way, on the 
assumption that the high-stakes game of postmortem reward and pun-
ishment requires that agents exercise ultimate control over their moral 
status. But the “new Augustinian normal” cannot meet this demand—at 
least, not without significant embellishment. I then consider an attempt to 
take that challenge seriously which comes from Michael Zimmerman, and 
I develop Zimmerman’s account as an alternative approach to original sin.
I confess at the outset, however, that I have little hope that this alterna-
tive approach to original sin will cohere with the scriptural source mate-
rial on the topic. That is to be expected, due to the obvious reason that the 
Apostle Paul, whose writings in Romans 5 provide the historical spring-
board for the doctrine, seemed not to have considered luck to be a prob-
lem for ultimate justice in the first place.4 Perhaps the non-Pauline bent of 
my proposal might suggest that it doesn’t really deserve the title “original 
sin” at all. Nevertheless, it serves a Pauline purpose—it increases the scope 
of sin’s dominion to include all of us—while doing less violence to our 
2See, for example, Copan, “Original Sin;” Wyma, “Innocent Sinfulness;” and perhaps 
Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief.
3For instance, in Responsibility and Atonement, Swinburne abandons original guilt 
while maintaining original inclination, but denies that original inclination strictly renders 
human sin inevitable. Similarly, Collins (in “Evolution and Original Sin”) and Mullen (in 
“Evolutionary Psychology”) both emphasize original inclination in their accounts of orig-
inal sin, even if they do not explicitly deny original guilt. Craig (in “#549 Original Sin”) 
explicitly embraces and defends original guilt, but equally explicitly denies its centrality 
to Christian doctrine. In each case, it is original inclination, not original guilt, which takes 
priority of place.
4The effect of passages like Romans 9, for instance, is that God gets to choose on whom 
he will bestow his grace—and on the basis of no human striving whatsoever. Further, he 
can “harden the heart” of individuals (such as Pharaoh) to meet his own ends. Thus, Paul 
appears to be largely indifferent to the kind of concern about the fairness of rewards or pun-
ishments that motivate this discussion.
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convictions about what ultimate justice would look like. That should be of 
interest on its own merits.
1. The Objection
The present problem for original sin is this: How am I to blame for the 
cards I  have been dealt (original guilt), or for my poor performance in 
light of the poor cards I have been dealt (original inclination)?
This question is not confined to the religious sphere—it has always 
been at the core of skepticism regarding moral responsibility in general. 
The hard determinist offers one variation of it: one way of understanding 
the cards we have been dealt is as a deterministic causal sequence. But 
determinism isn’t the only threat here, and the moral luck literature has 
revealed that there exists a problem for responsibility quite apart from 
determinism’s truth or falsity. Compatibilists and libertarians alike strug-
gle to accommodate the demands of the most vociferous of skeptics. This 
is because any act we make, whether it is freely willed or not, depends 
upon a host of features we do not control: the peculiar make-up of our 
physical and mental constitution and our position in a particular place and 
time—which will then influence the moral tests we face and the resources 
we have for meeting them. For any free act one performs, we can identify 
factors beyond one’s control such that, if they did not obtain, one would 
have done something else.
Observations of this sort led Nietzsche to deny the possibility of the 
kind of ultimate moral responsibility that he took to be an idol of his 
addled contemporaries. More recently, Thomas Nagel’s seminal paper on 
moral luck has invited skepticism about responsibility.
Galen Strawson has taken that invitation. So has Neil Levy. Once we 
confine our attention only to what we can control, Nagel writes, “[t]he 
area of genuine agency, and therefore of legitimate moral judgment, seems 
to shrink under this scrutiny to an extensionless point.”5
The typical reaction to this strident skepticism is to shrug it off as mak-
ing absurdly strong demands on moral responsibility. Given the central 
role that responsibility plays in our everyday lives, it would be silly to 
saddle it with an impossible condition and then flush the entire thing 
down the toilet. But when Nietzsche scoffs at ultimate moral responsibil-
ity, he has a particular target in mind: the idea that we could ever deserve 
ultimate judgment. Similarly with Strawson:
As I understand it, true moral responsibility is responsibility of such a kind 
that, if we have it, then it makes sense, at least, to suppose that it could be just 
to punish some of us with (eternal) torment in hell and reward others with 
(eternal) bliss in heaven.6
5See Strawson, “Impossibility of Moral Responsibility;” Levy, Hard Luck; and Nagel, 
“Moral Luck,” 35.
6Strawson, “Impossibility of Moral Responsibility,” 9.
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Naturally, when we are dealing with original sin, it is precisely this ulti-
mate judgment that is in the balance, and so in this context the extraor-
dinary demands of the skeptics take greater urgency than they would 
otherwise have. Whatever luck-laden concept of responsibility we are 
willing to employ for our terrestrial needs, we are tempted to concede 
that the raised stakes of ultimate judgment should require some ultimate 
form of control.
Of course, this temptation may still be wrongheaded. Perhaps, even 
after reflection on the ultimate theological context of eternal judgment, we 
might insist that “true moral responsibility” is genuinely subject to factors 
beyond our control—i.e., that there is “true moral luck.” This seems to be 
precisely what the “new Augustinian normal” will require, at least in the 
straightforward way in which that position was presented above. If we 
inherit some defective condition which inclines us to sin, then that condi-
tion (over which we have no control) will influence what we do during the 
course of our lives, and of course on this proposal we may be responsible 
for our subsequent sin. Original inclination posits very bad luck in our 
constitution; given the way it is said to play out in our actions, we would 
be saddled with very bad constitutive moral luck.
Perhaps that is the best we can do. But I  am interested here to see 
whether we might do better—that is, whether we might preserve original 
sin while at the same time honoring the strident anti-luck intuition of the 
skeptics and denying all moral luck. In the next section, I will identify a 
strategy for meeting that challenge.
2. Zimmerman and the Counterfactual Gambit
Theological history has offered multiple strategies for engaging the strong 
anti-luck challenge offered above. Michael Rea has offered an interpreta-
tion of Jonathan Edwards, according to which we are something close to 
causa sui, since (using some creative metaphysical wrangling with per-
sonal identity, which in part invokes divine fiat) we strictly and literally 
sinned with Adam in the Garden.7 Any corrupted nature we inherit is 
thus our own fault. Robert Adams has reminded us of Kant’s work in 
Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, according to which we create our 
own defective constitution through an act outside of time, as transcendent 
beings of the noumenal world.8 Alternatively, we could neutralize luck’s 
effect on our moral status by attempting to eliminate the vicissitudes of 
fortune altogether, and to connect our status to some essential element of 
our natures. As Charlotte Katzoff has pointed out,9 a suggestion of this 
sort has been offered by Rabbi Judah Loeb of Prague, also known as “the 
Maharal.”
7Rea, “Metaphysics of Original Sin,” 335–338, 341–342.
8Adams, “Original Sin.”
9Katzoff, “Religious Luck and Religious Virtue.”
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Each of these strategies is a hard sell. In the case of Kant, we must work 
our way through the obscurities of the phenomenal/noumenal distinc-
tion and the problematic notion of timeless agency. Neither Edwards nor 
the Maharal seem particularly interested in the above objection them-
selves, and the metaphysics employed in each case seems ill-suited for the 
purpose. For Edwards, the result (that we literally sinned with Adam) is 
derived only as an effect of divine fiat. With the Maharal, the concept of 
luck that is neutralized—involving chance or modal fragility—is not the 
one that is relevant for the objection. The objection concerns luck as the 
absence of control,10 and we have no control over our essential properties.
So much, then, for creating ourselves (either within historical time or 
out of it), and so much for constraining the realm of contingency through 
a revisionary modal metaphysic. There remains at least one other option, 
which, in a manner of speaking, is the opposite of the Maharal’s: rather 
than deny that our lives could have been relevantly different from what 
they currently are, we may embrace this fact, and then revise our under-
standing of moral responsibility to be sensitive to it. This is the suggestion 
of Michael Zimmerman. It, too, may be a hard sell, but it is worth explor-
ing in the current context.
Zimmerman’s radical opposition to moral luck is expressed in a strong 
comparative condition of control:
If (a) someone’s being F (where “F” designates some complex property com-
prising both epistemic and metaphysical components) is sufficient for that 
person’s being morally responsible to some degree x, then, if (b) it is true of S 
at some time that he or she would be F if p were true, and (c) p’s being true is 
not in S’s control at that time, then (d) S is morally responsible to degree x.11
The effect is that luck be neutralized, not by the impossible demand that 
the agent be causa sui, but by considering what would have been true of 
the agent had things beyond his or her control gone differently.
As Zimmerman develops his case, he considers a sequence of exam-
ples, beginning with one adapted from Nagel. George murders Henry by 
gunfire, thereby instantiating some complex F which guarantees his cul-
pability: malice, knowledge of the likely effects of his actions, control over 
his bodily faculties, free will, the causing of harm in some straightforward 
(non-deviant) way, and so on. Meanwhile, across town, Georg’s otherwise 
qualitatively identical attempt at murdering Henrik is upset by the unex-
pected interception of his bullet by a passing bird.12 Surely, he says, luck in 
the results of their actions should not generate a difference in their degree 
of responsibility. We could, of course, try to derive their moral parity 
10Or so I say. Recently, some scholars have bucked this trend by offering modal or chancy 
analyses of moral luck. For defenses of the traditional understanding of moral luck as involv-
ing lack of control, see Hartman, In Defense of Moral Luck, and Anderson, “Moral Lack of 
Control.”
11Zimmerman, “Taking Luck Seriously,” 565n33.
12Zimmerman, “Taking Luck Seriously,” 560.
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simply by deleting a component of F from consideration when evaluating 
each agent’s culpability—say, by ignoring the results of the act and focus-
ing only on the act itself (including the description of the agent’s mental 
states, her free will, and so on). But this strategy will not help with a host 
of other examples where Zimmerman’s anti-luck intuition seems equally 
strong. Georg would have been just as responsible had he never fired the 
gun at all, due to a truck cutting off his line of fire,13 or if he had simply 
been too deaf to hear Henrik’s insults, and thus not enraged enough to 
formulate his murderous intention in the first place.14 Passing birds, pass-
ing trucks, and past-its-prime hearing are all neutral from a moral point 
of view and are (in these cases) beyond the reach of Georg’s control; given 
that Georg would have murdered Henrik but for features like these, Georg 
is responsible to the same degree as George, even if he never succeeded in 
his attempt, completed his attempt, or formed his intention to begin with.
Cases like these carry intuitive appeal in part because they track com-
mon patterns of evaluation that some of us are already inclined to make. 
“Be careful around Georg,” we might say. “He’s the kind of guy who can 
fly off the handle at a moment’s notice—he’s not above murder at a per-
ceived insult.” Such a guy, we are tempted to suggest, could well be mor-
ally on a par with many of the inmates on death row, even if he has a clean 
criminal record. Yet the implications of Zimmerman’s anti-luck principle 
will reach much further than these examples let on: for the kind of guy 
one is (one’s temperament, values, and so on) will typically not be neutral 
from a moral point of view, but may itself be beyond the reach of one’s 
control (and thus serve as a value for p in the above principle).
It is not hard to imagine how this may be so. Consider some fictional 
cases. Jean Valjean, Hugo tells us, becomes a noble man, and this nobility 
helps him to bring about the noble things he does. But the fate of his char-
acter hinges on whether the saintly bishop protects him from arrest in the 
opening act of the novel. Perhaps his doppelganger Jacques Valjacques is 
not so lucky, goes back to prison, and becomes a villain. Madame Defarge, 
Dickens tells us, happily knits while watching the heads of the inno-
cent roll. Then again, Madame Defarge is also the victim of the cruelty 
of Marquis St. Evremonde. Perhaps her doppelganger Madame Debarge 
does not suffer in her youth and becomes a kind of female Pimpernel. 
And so on. Valjean’s and Defarge’s characters are themselves subject to 
luck. So, by Zimmerman’s principle, we must think of what each would 
have done in the shoes of his or her doppelganger—how Valjean would 
have behaved if burdened with the villainous character of Valjacques, or 
what Defarge would have done had she enjoyed the nobler dispositions 
of Debarge.
13Zimmerman, “Taking Luck Seriously,” 563.
14Zimmerman, “Taking Luck Seriously,” 565.
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Of course, we must be careful. Regardless of what he would have 
done in Valjacques’s shoes, Valjean is not guilty for Valjacques-like vil-
lainy, since no such villainy occurred in his case; nor could Defarge 
be praiseworthy for Debarge-like heroism. Zimmerman distinguishes 
between the scope of responsibility (what we are responsible for) and 
the degree of responsibility (how blameworthy or praiseworthy we 
are). The former is subject to luck while the latter is not; nevertheless, 
he insists, “[d]egree of responsibility counts for everything, scope for 
nothing, when it comes to such moral evaluation of agents.”15 The effect 
of such a view is that factors beyond our control no longer have any 
influence over how we stack up morally, all things considered. When 
we look at our “true moral responsibility,” everything hinges upon facts 
about us—both what we in fact do and what we would have done if 
things were different.
Now, such a view will ultimately require true counterfactuals of liber-
tarian freedom. Obviously, counterfactuals of some sort are necessary—
we need facts about what Valjean would have done in radically different 
circumstances. But not just any counterfactuals will do. I won’t put too 
fine a point on it here, but the gist is this.16 There must be indeterminacy in 
the range of counterfactual behavior in question; otherwise, the counter-
factuals would be merely inelegant comments on the laws of nature, and 
all agents would be indistinguishable in terms of degree of moral respon-
sibility (barring differences in essential properties that constrain the range 
of counterfactual circumstances they can inherit, but as noted earlier, 
appealing to essential differences does nothing to increase the degree of 
our control over our moral standing). And not just any indeterminacy 
would do. Employing counterfactuals of probabilistic freedom (which 
Zimmerman himself suggests)17 makes moral responsibility a function 
of inelegant comments on probability, which is not much of an upgrade. 
Random or capricious indeterminacy seems the wrong thing in which to 
ground responsibility. Rather, the indeterministic differences in responsi-
bility between moral agents need to be up to the agents themselves. We 
are left with full blown counterfactuals of libertarian freedom, the kind of 
thing of which Molinism is made.
Of course, Molinism has faced a great deal of opposition, but it also has 
a surprising number of proponents—at least as many as there are propo-
nents of the metaphysical notions promulgated by Edwards, Kant, and the 
Maharal. I won’t rehearse the debate over the plausibility of Molinism here. 
The question to ask in this context is not metaphysical, but moral: assuming 
that Molinism is true, can the proposal being offered by Zimmerman make 
sense as a theory of ultimate moral responsibility?
15Zimmerman, “Taking Luck Seriously,” 568.
16To get the finer point, see Hartman’s treatment of the subject in his comprehensive 
examination of moral luck (In Defense of Moral Luck, 73–80).
17Zimmerman, “Taking Luck Seriously,” 573–574.
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Well, it is unlikely ever to win the popular vote. We are talking about 
a perspective according to which what you would have done as a Cro-
Magnon in the Paleolithic Age counts every bit as much toward your 
degree of responsibility as what you actually do during the course of your 
life. Such a thesis is bound to provoke an incredulous stare. For instance, 
here is Rik Peels’s reaction: “If we continue this line of reasoning, we turn 
out to be blameworthy for being such that we would have done all sorts of 
wrongs in radically different historical circumstances, in other parts of the 
universe, and in scenarios in which our character is radically different,” 
which “seems to be a dire consequence, to say the least.”18 Indeed, it does 
seem to be dire—and as popularity contests go, how things seem mat-
ters more than what lies behind the seeming. But we may legitimately ask 
whether the incredulous stare is justified. What makes this consequence so 
dire, exactly?
There are several concerns. The first and most obvious is epistemic: 
how could we ever know what Valjean would have done if he had been 
in the shoes of Valjacques? How can anyone (other than God) know what 
you would have done as a Cro-Magnon in the Paleolithic Age? Since we 
are talking about an unrestricted range of counterfactuals of freedom, 
the vast majority of the facts that ground our moral responsibility will be 
inscrutable to mere mortals. That means that no mere mortals can have 
a clear sense of how they stack up morally, all things considered. As a 
result, Zimmerman’s proposal flunks out completely when we consider 
the many uses to which we ordinarily put the concept of moral responsi-
bility. Who deserves what prison sentence? On a retributivist line, accord-
ing to which our punishment should match our desert, we are unsure. 
(Perhaps the prosecutor is more blameworthy than the defendant.) Should 
I blame someone who has done me wrong? What if I would have done the 
same or worse in his shoes? Should I apologize to the one who has done me 
wrong, since it might turn out that I would have done worse in his shoes? 
And so on.
However, for anyone familiar with the history of the moral luck issue, 
this consequence is familiar and to be expected. Anti-luck scholars have 
always inherited the burden of explaining our luck-sensitive praising and 
blaming practices, given their luck-neutral account of responsibility. (Why 
do we blame the drunk driver who kills someone more than the drunk 
driver who gets home safely, if the two are morally on a par?) A typical 
strategy has always been to appeal to some epistemic feature—luck plays 
a role in what we know about, not in the actual desert of the agents.19 
Zimmerman’s proposal simply follows this course to its ultimate limit. 
Just as his zeal for protecting moral responsibility from luck reaches an 
extreme, so too does the gap between our actual practices of praising and 
18Peels, “Modal Solution,” 76.
19For examples of this kind of response, see Jensen, “Morality and Luck;” Richards, “Luck 
and Desert;” and Rescher, “Moral Luck.”
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blaming and his understanding of what our moral responsibility amounts 
to. And this extreme gap is (predictably) capable of being explained in 
part by an extreme limit in our knowledge of the relevant facts. Extreme 
epistemic limitation, then, seems to be the natural consequence of the very 
project we are embarking upon, and so it should be no surprise that the 
resulting luck-free concept of ultimate responsibility should have little 
value for our ordinary needs.
The more pressing problem in the current context is not epistemic. 
Rather, it is whether Zimmerman is offering us the right sort of control 
over our responsibility—the sort in light of which “it makes sense, at least, 
to suppose that it could be just to punish some of us with (eternal) torment 
in hell and reward others with (eternal) bliss in heaven.” There is at least 
one significant concern about whether he is.
The luck-neutralizing effect of Zimmerman’s proposal requires that the 
actual course of events, including one’s actual behavior in the real world, 
counts no more against one’s degree of responsibility than any other 
actualizable history in which one participates. If I would have raided my 
neighbor’s supply of mammoth meat as a Cro-Magnon in the Paleolithic 
Age, then this fact (and others like it) count toward my degree of respon-
sibility every bit as much as the facts describing my actual behavior in 
the actual world. When one surveys the entirety of facts upon which my 
degree of responsibility is based (that is, when one surveys the entirety 
of true counterfactuals of freedom describing my counterfactual actions), 
then what I actually do in the course of history counts for only the tiniest 
fraction of the facts determining my blameworthiness or praiseworthi-
ness. Now, what can I do here, in the actual course of events, to change 
what I would have done as a Cro-Magnon in the Paleolithic Age? What 
kind of control can I be said to exercise over facts like these?
The answer, surely, is that there is nothing I  can do to change the 
truth value of counterfactuals of freedom with false antecedents.20 The 
effect of making responsibility sensitive to counterfactuals of libertar-
ian freedom, then, is to split two features that we normally ascribe to 
20Here, it is worth noting a suggestion by Michael Rea that would identify original sin 
with transworld depravity. His goal is to show how original sin is consistent with the fol-
lowing principle:
(MR) A  person P is morally responsible for the obtaining of a state of affairs S 
only if S obtains (or obtained) and P could have prevented S from obtaining. 
(“Metaphysics of Original Sin,” 320)
To get this result, he employs the following premise:
(M2) For any counterfactual of freedom C that is true of a human person P, P is or 
was able to prevent C from being true of P. (Ibid, 345)
But (M2) is surely false: I can do nothing to prevent the truth of counterfactuals that describe 
what I would have done in the Paleolithic Age.
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responsibility-grounding control. On the one hand, we care about alterna-
tive possibilities—the idea that, to be responsible for something, it must 
be (or have been) within the agent’s power to prevent that thing from 
occurring. On the other, we want the thing for which the agent is respon-
sible to be ultimately up to the agent.21 Typically, we expect to treat these 
features together; an ordinary account of control will show how the agent 
could have done otherwise (in some sense), and how the event in question 
is ultimately up to the agent (in some sense).22 But if Zimmerman’s pro-
posal is right, we do not have significant alternative possibilities concern-
ing our blameworthiness or praiseworthiness. We are capable of doing 
otherwise with respect only to a tiny percentage of the facts that ground 
our responsibility. The rest of these facts are features of us to which we 
are condemned. So how can it make sense for God to make some ultimate 
judgment of us in virtue of them?
The answer is that the other feature of responsibility-grounding con-
trol is dialed to its maximum setting—responsibility, on this construal, is 
all about us and nothing but us, and in a way that is distinctly different 
from the Maharal’s attempt to ground our religious fate in our essential 
properties.
We must, of course, remember the question before us: assuming that 
Molinism is true, can we make sense of a Zimmerman-like perspective 
on moral responsibility? But the assumption of Molinism involves the 
assumption of an extraordinarily robust set of facts about persons. These 
are not facts about external circumstances, or the regularities of nature, 
or necessary truths. They are facts about our libertarian free will. The 
Molinist, then, believes in an extraordinary catalogue of facts about our 
free will which his opponents refuse to acknowledge. Rather than balk 
at his employment of them in an assessment of the agent’s moral stand-
ing, we might wonder whether he can responsibly ignore their relevance. 
(If you would have been a villain but for some fortunate turn of events, 
doesn’t that matter?) And if he did ignore their relevance, wouldn’t it fol-
low that one’s responsibility has more to do with God’s decision about 
which world to actualize than the agent’s decisions in the course of history, 
which are in part contingent upon God’s creative act?
In fact, the Molinist believes in something that his opponent cannot rec-
ognize: a complete and pure description of an agent’s libertarian free will. 
For those who deny that there can be true counterfactuals of libertarian 
freedom, a complete description of an agent’s will cannot extend beyond 
the confines of the actual world—and so it is riddled with the impurities 
of luck, which create the traction of circumstances against which that will 
21Robert Kane, for one, identifies each of these features as stimulating incompatibilist 
thought on the free will issue, although he thinks the latter to be the dominant motivation 
(see his Significance of Free Will).
22The most obvious exceptions to this trend are those who, in the wake of Frankfurt, deny 
the principle of alternative possibilities in the first place.
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is exercised. But for the Molinist, the complete description of the agent’s 
will must include a great library of true counterfactuals of libertarian free-
dom which, taken in total, eliminate those impurities. What is left is the 
naked will. If that naked will becomes the object of our evaluation, then it 
is me and me alone that is on the scales of justice—not the circumstances 
of my birth, not my neurological makeup, not the culture in which I was 
raised, nor any other feature of me external to my will.
It is this emphasis on the will that sets a Zimmerman-like approach to 
responsibility apart from the Maharal’s. Functionally, there is little differ-
ence between the two accounts: one enters the world with a moral sta-
tus that one can do precious little to change. But if, like the Maharal, we 
decide simply to ground our religious standing in essential properties, we 
will load the scales of justice with impurities: our evaluation might well 
include such features as the circumstances of my birth, my neurological 
makeup, or the culture in which I was raised, so long as these features are 
stripped of their contingent status. For Zimmerman, by contrast, it is the 
will alone that matters. So, while his account all but abandons our access 
to alternative possibilities, it makes us ultimately responsible in an ulti-
mate way. And if God judges us against the standard of a complete and 
pure description of our own will, what could be fairer?
Perhaps there is another issue here—perhaps our metaphysical prob-
lem about alternative possibilities might be thought to prompt a cor-
responding motivational problem. If there is little we can do to change 
our degree of responsibility, what motivation do we have to do the right 
thing? After all, no matter how deeply we are invested in doing our duty, 
no matter how severe the sacrifices we make, our efforts won’t do much 
to change our moral standing in the eyes of God.
The question of moral motivation is an ancient one, and I do not want 
to make light of the objection. However, the current objection gets its teeth 
only if the solution to the problem runs through our desire to be good in 
the eyes of God (which is distinct from our desire to please God)—and 
there may be something cynical about solving the problem of moral moti-
vation in this way. Euthyphro-like reasoning might encourage us to hold 
that God’s own commands are motivated by the objective value of their 
content. If that’s good enough for God, why shouldn’t it be good enough 
for us? (Why not kick Suzie in the shins? Because Suzie is a person and it 
is bad to cause her unnecessary pain.) But if the facts on the ground are not 
enough to motivate us, why shouldn’t our love of God and the desire to 
please God be our proper motivation? Further, if it is dialectically innocent 
to assume that all human persons are in need of God’s grace (as, indeed, 
that is the idea the doctrine of original sin is attempting to explain), then 
shouldn’t we conclude that the quest to make ourselves good in the eyes 
of God is a fool’s errand to begin with?
Musings like these prevent me from embracing one of the criticisms 
that is sometimes levied against this counterfactual understanding of 
moral responsibility. In her survey of possible solutions to the problem 
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of religious luck, Zagzebski considers something very like our current 
Molinist suggestion, and then quickly discards it:
A feature of it that many would find seriously defective, though, is that it 
makes the actual world meaningless as far as moral evaluation is concerned. 
In fact, there is really no reason to have an actual world at all for such pur-
poses; God might just as well have created the beings he wanted and have 
gone straight on to their final judgment, skipping the in-between step of 
letting a particular world unfold.23
Zagzebski is right, of course, that on the current proposal the unfolding of 
world history would cease to have a significant impact upon the objects 
of moral judgment. And yet it may be she, and not her opponent, who is 
denigrating the value of the actual world—if, that is, she is inviting us to 
treat the world as a mere theater for working out our salvation or for sep-
arating the wheat from the chaff. The rest of us see rather more in it than 
that. In fact, it is precisely because the actual world has value that there are 
moral obligations at all. There is only one (actual) world, after all, and we 
are all stewards of it. Because there is just one world, we only get the tini-
est of glimpses into who we are, morally speaking, but this blindness does 
nothing to mitigate our need to love and care for the one world that exists.
3. Original Sin Revisited
The foregoing (criminally cursory) comments are intended to show that, 
however inadequate it might be for our everyday use, a Zimmerman-
like approach to moral responsibility is not altogether implausible in the 
context of ultimate judgment from an omniscient being with the aim of 
ultimate justice. But they also suggest a way of understanding original 
sin—or, more precisely, original guilt.
How is it that we can say that I am endowed with nothing but “my 
helpless estate,” as one hymn puts it, or that amazing grace is needed 
to “save a wretch like me,” as another expresses it (sometimes enthusi-
astically sung by a preschooler with scarcely any understanding of the 
words)? What makes my estate so helpless, and how might the apparently 
innocent preschooler be a wretch after all? My estate is helpless because 
there is very little I can do to change my moral standing. And even the 
preschooler is a wretch, because the counterfactuals that describe his or 
her will were true long before his or her birth—they are so original, in fact, 
that (on the middle knowledge hypothesis) they are logically prior to the 
existence of the universe. Despite all this, there can be no doubt about the 
justice of the case—for it is each person’s will and that will alone that is 
being judged. Paradoxically, the dominant objection to original sin, when 
given free rein, leads us right back to one variant of it. This is not original 
guilt for Adam’s sin, per se, but it is original guilt nonetheless.
23Zagzebski, “Religious Luck,” 408.
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3.1. Attractions of the View
This understanding of original sin carries several advantages over a more 
traditional approach. The first, and most important for the current context, 
is that it promises to increase the scope of sin’s dominion to include all of 
us without violating our most fundamental intuitions about what ultimate 
justice should look like. That was the difficulty with which we began, and 
a Zimmerman-like proposal offers a way forward in this regard.
Naturally, this is not the first time that Molinist counterfactuals of free-
dom have been levied for this purpose. Rea explores the idea of identify-
ing original sin with transworld depravity.24 Copan, Mullen, and Craig 
all employ these counterfactuals in a more focused way: perhaps we are 
responsible for what we would have done in Adam’s situation, and per-
haps all of us would have sinned in the Garden.25 Each of these propos-
als inherits an additional metaphysical commitment, however, that the 
Zimmerman-like proposal does not carry. In Rea’s case, we must assume 
that each of us really is transworld depraved—that no matter how God 
made the world, if he put us in it, we would err. In the case of Copan, 
Mullen, and Craig, the assumption is that each of us would have done the 
same as Adam in the Garden. Here is Copan on the topic:
One particular objection commonly raised regarding Adam’s headship of 
the human race is this: “Why should Adam be my representative head? He 
really fouled things up, and now, through no fault of my own, everyone 
else is paying the consequences.” Behind this comment is an unarticulated, 
arrogant presumption: “If I had been in Adam’s place, I would have obeyed 
God’s simple command not to take from the fruit. I could have prevented 
the calamitous fallout from the first disobedience.”26
Indeed, that is an arrogant presumption. But then Copan proceeds to 
make a presumption of his own—that all of us would have failed the same 
test. What justifies this claim (other than convenience for defending the 
doctrine of original sin)?27
There is a further puzzle concerning a strategy like Copan’s. Clearly, 
such a proposal requires that we can be to blame for what we would 
have done in other circumstances. I have suggested above that this is not 
problematic. What is problematic is that we should be responsible only 
for what we would have done in Adam’s situation alone. Why single out 
Adam? If I  can be responsible in virtue of my counterfactual behavior, 
why consider only one instance of it? Why not all of it? (Here we face a 
situation analogous to what we saw in the case of Edwards. Edwards asks 
us to believe that God, by arbitrary fiat, assigns the stages of Adam to me, 
24Rea, “Metaphysics of Original Sin,” 345–353.
25See Copan, “Original Sin;” Mullen, “Evolutionary Psychology;” and Craig, “#549 
Original Sin.”
26Copan, “Original Sin,” 540.
27An anonymous reviewer for this journal has suggested one possible explanation: the 
felix culpa theodicy.
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so that Adam’s behavior is my own. Why Adam’s stages and not Mother 
Teresa’s? Why not everyone’s?) Adam, of course, might play a unique role 
in history, serving as the “federal head” of humanity. So, we may be par-
ticularly interested in what we would have done in his shoes. Even so, if 
we can be morally responsible in virtue of what we would have done in 
Adam’s shoes, that is because we can be morally responsible in virtue of 
what we would have done in others’ shoes generally. (Put contrapositively, 
if I can’t be responsible in virtue of my counterfactual behavior generally, 
it makes little sense to say that I could be responsible in virtue of what 
I would have done in the Garden.) This way of reasoning, then, leads well 
beyond thinking of some particular counterfactual of freedom. It leads to 
thinking of the entire scope of our counterfactual behavior—which is the 
proposal Zimmerman is offering.
For that matter, the proposal on offer makes no essential reference to an 
historical Adam at all. Some might find this to be a problem with the view. 
I am inclined to think of it as an advantage. Perhaps, despite our current 
understanding of natural history, the idea of an historical Adam cannot 
be dismissed out of hand.28 Nevertheless, the idea is hardly the sort of 
thing to attract scholars who are not already well within the cloister, and 
so a view on original sin seems to increase in plausibility by shedding its 
commitment to it.
Similarly, the view on offer requires no commitment to the doctrine 
of original inclination—in fact, luck in our constitution is one of the 
things Zimmerman’s proposal is protecting our responsibility from. 
Again, some might find this to be a problem. (Copan on this score cites 
a famous quip from Chesterton that original sin—and in particular orig-
inal inclination—“is the only part of Christian theology which can really 
be proved.”29) But there is a way in which it is an advantage. After all, it 
seems that any inclination that we inherit will have some neurological 
correlate, quite apart from whether mind-body reductionism is true. If 
our inclinations are distorted, why should we look for a spiritual, rather 
than a neurological, solution to our problem? A completed brain science, 
it seems, may threaten to render a spiritual solution obsolete. Of course, 
careful accounts on original inclination may successfully navigate around 
this problem.30 One benefit of the current proposal is that it doesn’t have 
to. No neurological advances can protect us from our Molinist counter-
factual profile—they can only change the constitutive features we inherit.
Finally, the Zimmerman-like approach to original sin may promise to 
offer a more convincing account of the “equalizing” tenor of Christian 
28Hud Hudson (in “Essay on Eden”) has reminded us that literalism about Genesis 3 may 
be as much a metaphysical as an empirical hypothesis, and so might not admit of straight-
forward empirical refutation.
29Copan, “Original Sin,” 533.
30Robin Collins, for one, claims that original inclination is a kind of inherited spiritual 
darkness which operates on its own level, like culture, but distinct from both culture and 
biology (“Evolution and Original Sin,” 470–473).
19ON RESPONSIBILITY AND ORIGINAL SIN: A MOLINIST SUGGESTION
teaching on sin. “None is righteous, no, not one,” says the Apostle, cit-
ing Psalm 14:3. “Whoever keeps the whole law but fails in one point has 
become guilty of all of it,” says James. All are equally guilty, equally in 
desperate need of God’s grace. Yet, on the surface, these claims do not 
seem to match our moral experience: there seems to be a stark moral dif-
ference between a Gandhi and a Pol Pot; some, it seems, are worse sinners 
than others. How, then, can we vindicate the idea that we are all in the 
same mess when it comes to sin? One strategy is to go deep, to examine 
the foundations of our motivations and to uncover whatever rot might lie 
beneath. But another is to go wide, to consider what we would have done 
had our luck been different. That is the strategy suggested by Zimmerman. 
The two strategies, of course, are not exclusive, but the latter will secure 
the desired result most swiftly and obviously, for the reasons discussed 
above. What would you have done had you been in Pol Pot’s shoes? Do 
you even know?
3.2.Objections
On the other hand, there are concerns about the adequacy of this model of 
original sin. The first and most obvious, as noted at the outset, is its lack of 
scriptural motivation. Given that Paul seems uninterested in the problem 
which set our path, however, I do not take this feature to be a surprise. 
Given that our original problem really is a problem (contra Paul), the best 
one could hope for is that a Zimmerman-like approach to the topic may 
deliver some of the same results that Paul wished to secure, even if it is in 
a non-Pauline way.
Nevertheless, since our model has taken such an unconventional route, 
we might wonder whether we have opened up another scriptural prob-
lem: quite apart from whether scripture coheres with this model of origi-
nal sin, we might question whether we see in it anything like this notion 
of sin at all—the notion that we can be blameworthy in virtue of the 
counterfactual.
In fact, I  suspect we might. For instance, several prescriptions of the 
Sermon on the Mount could easily be given a counterfactual reading. 
(The lascivious but corpuscular gentleman with an eye for his neighbor’s 
wife lacks only the opportunity to commit adultery, and thus is as blame-
worthy as his svelte doppelganger who completes the deed.) Matthew 
11:21 invokes counterfactual reasoning in the condemnation of the cities 
Chorazin and Bethsaida. In general, much of the tenor of Jesus’s minis-
try will have an anti-luck bent, and counterfactual reasoning easily comes 
to mind as a way of articulating it. Those who would stone the sinning 
woman discover that they have no moral high ground from which to do 
so—as sinners themselves, who knows what they would have done in the 
woman’s shoes?
But at no point do we find anything quite like the suggestion that we 
may be responsible for what we would have done in radically different 
20 Faith and Philosophy
circumstances, as the Zimmerman model would have it. Nor should we 
expect to do so: the subject matter of the New Testament is rather too 
urgent to engage in such speculations. But this fact needn’t prevent us 
from speculating—and the speculations provided here do not strike me as 
being beyond the pale, given that they are an extrapolation of an idea that 
appears to cohere with much of the scriptural narrative.
But naturally, the objections to this model will extend well beyond its 
apparent lack of harmony with the scriptural record. A second concern 
with the current proposal is that, to the extent that we part ways with 
original inclination, we will part ways with some of the apologetic uses 
of that doctrine. One is Copan’s suggestion that original inclination may 
do more to explain our moral experience than any secular substitute.31 
Another may stem from Reformed epistemology, which will make use of 
the noetic effect of sin.32 Of course, a Zimmerman-like model on original 
sin is not inconsistent with some doctrine of original inclination, but it 
leaves that doctrine less motivated, and so it might undermine these and 
other apologetic pursuits.
Third, we may justly ask why a Zimmerman-like approach to respon-
sibility should be construed as a model of original sin, as opposed to 
original righteousness, or some combination of the two. In a later work, 
Zimmerman acknowledges that his account of responsibility entails that 
we are condemned both to be culpable (for our counterfactual bad actions) 
and to be laudable (for our counterfactual good actions) at the same time.33 
Why, then, in evaluating our counterfactual moral profiles, should we 
emphasize the culpability, insisting that we are dealing with original sin, 
rather than something else?
An answer to this concern will likely employ one or both of two strat-
egies. On the one hand, we might make pessimistic predictions concern-
ing what we are likely to do in alternative circumstances. On the other, 
we may suspect that the standards we face from a perfectly just God are 
rather higher than may otherwise be supposed. Consider, as an exercise, a 
test raised by John Mullen when discussing this topic: what does it mean 
to be perfectly reconciled to God? Wouldn’t some sort of counterfactual 
purity be necessary? If I happen to do the right thing, but would easily do 
the wrong thing in other circumstances, wouldn’t that suggest that I am 
not perfectly reconciled to God?34 If Mullen’s suggestion is correct, then 
it seems that we are right in emphasizing the problem of culpability, and 
that the game we are playing has rather stricter rules than the game being 
played in the secular world.
But Mullen’s suggestion also leads us to the fourth and most perplexing 
problem facing our current proposal. For how could such a reconciliation 
31Copan, “Original Sin,” 533–536.
32For example, see Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief.
33Zimmerman, “Moral Luck: A Partial Map,” 606.
34Mullen, “Evolutionary Psychology,” 278.
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occur in the first place? Molinism, after all, is a proposal about God’s mid-
dle knowledge: the objects of this knowledge are explanatorily prior to 
God’s creative act. Thus, if the counterfactuals which ground my responsi-
bility are beyond the reach of neurological science to change, they are also 
beyond the reach of God to change. (We must remember that Plantinga’s 
original purpose in invoking them in his rediscovery of Molinism was to 
identify a kind of thing that God cannot do.) We do not have this problem 
on the more traditional view according to which we now inherit a kind of 
fallen condition. A fallen condition can be cured; depraved counterfactu-
als of libertarian freedom cannot. Doesn’t this entail that the current pro-
posal secures original sin at the price of abandoning hope for any future 
redemption? Original sin of this sort seems rather too original.
In fact, this feature of our counterfactuals threatens to upset the tradi-
tional understanding of both ends of history. As noted earlier, the current 
proposal makes no reference to an historical Adam. But it also contains 
no room for a moral prelapsarian state of any sort—whether at the front 
end of human history or in the lives of individual persons. We are brought 
into the world with the moral status that we have, and if there ever was 
such a person as Adam, he was brought into the world with moral status 
that he has. Thus, the current proposal appears to be inconsistent with the 
doctrine of a Fall from innocence.35
The degree to which this is a problem depends on the degree to which 
we are attached to that doctrine. I suspect, though, that the primary sig-
nificance of the doctrine of the Fall lies with the other end of history. For 
instance, in his discussion of original sin, Copan emphasizes the impor-
tance of mankind’s prelapsarian state, because he sees in it the fact that, 
in our very nature, we have the imago Dei—the sort of thing that is worth 
redeeming in the first place. “We are a mixed bag, a disfigured beauty, 
a damaged work of art,” he writes,36 and thus it is conceivable that we 
become a restored work of art on the other side. But if the pregame mat-
ters because of the endgame, then the endgame is the feature that matters 
most, and it is here that the current proposal needs to get it right.
Perhaps, despite appearances, it can do so, and I suspect that the prob-
lems we see here are manageable—or, at any rate, close to as manageable 
as analogous problems we will face on a more traditional understand-
ing. Mullen himself provides a hint of how our solution might work in an 
endnote:
Note that it is not necessary (for being in a perfect relationship with God) 
that there was never a time when it was true of us that we would sin in 
some set of hypothetical conditions. If that were a necessary condition 
then everyone on this planet must forever abandon hope of ever being in a 
35It is not, however, strictly inconsistent with the history of the Fall. It is also worth noting 
that my own suggestion is not the only one with this consequence. Rea’s suggested associa-
tion of original sin with transworld depravity appears to generate the same result.
36Copan, “Original Sin,” 521–522.
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perfect relationship with God. Rather, the necessary condition (for being in 
a perfect relationship with God) is merely that there be no present or future 
time at which it is true of us that we would sin in some set of hypothetical 
conditions.37
As it stands, this suggestion is not quite enough—counterfactuals of liber-
tarian freedom do not simply change their truth value over time. However, 
other things do change over time, and those other things may constrain 
the range of hypothetical scenarios that it is possible for us to inherit, con-
sistently with that history. Here is one conceivable way: Suppose God cre-
ates a new heaven and a new earth and sustains them in a particular way 
for all eternity, severely delimiting the range of any possible future cir-
cumstances. A certain counterfactual purity may yet hold within that nar-
rower range of circumstances, despite the fact that we may be thoroughly 
depraved outside of it. Because of God’s activity, however, we would 
never sin in any future scenario that is possible relative to that activity.
How would we evaluate agents who inherit such divine grace? 
Relative to God’s grace, we may say that they are redeemed. But in an 
absolute sense, given Zimmerman’s method, we must say they are still 
depraved—for it would still be true of them that they would sin under 
less heavenly circumstances. Thus it is that “no man may boast” in such 
a heaven. Compare this against the traditional account, according to 
which our debilitating fallen condition (original inclination) is cured, 
and we enjoy an eternity in heaven untainted by sin. Still, there are no 
boasters in this heaven, either. That is because the citizens of this heaven 
have in fact sinned, and a complete description of their histories must 
acknowledge this fact. Their presence in this heaven is due to the grace of 
God. In an absolute sense, which acknowledges all the facts about these 
agents (including their complete history), even on the traditional model, 
we may say that they are depraved. Their redemption is relative to a par-
ticular segment of their histories, just as redemption on a Zimmerman-
like account is relative to a particular segment of their counterfactual 
profiles. If there is a difference between the two models, it is that, on the 
traditional model, we may say that the redeemed are fully redeemed 
at this and all future times. We cannot say this on the Zimmerman-like 
model. Yet, we may wonder how significant the distinction is between 
being redeemed at this and all future times and being redeemed relative to 
facts that occur at this and all future times. Perhaps the distinction is not at 
all significant—in which case the Zimmerman model fares as well as the 
traditional one.
Of course, there are further problems lurking in the background. If God 
could simply make a new heaven and a new earth that expunges all pos-
sible sin, why didn’t God do so to begin with and circumvent the mess we 
are in now? This is the “problem of heaven,” which is one of the thorniest 
elements of the broader problem of evil. If it is true that we would never 
37Mullen, “Evolutionary Psychology,” 281n19
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sin in such a future, can it really be libertarian free will that we enjoy there? 
This is the “problem of heavenly freedom,” which threatens to make havoc 
with free will theodicies. I will not here attempt a solution to these prob-
lems but will simply observe that they are not new ones. When it comes to 
providing room for hope in our future regeneration, the Zimmerman-style 
suggestion on original sin offered here is not obviously on worse ground 
than a more traditional model.38
Finally, it is worth pausing a moment to consider one of the more poign-
ant moments of world literature—the famous chapter “Rebellion” from 
Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov. In this passage, Ivan Karamazov 
torments his younger brother with detailed descriptions of atrocities com-
mitted against children, as he develops his own peculiar version of the 
problem of evil. At one point he says:
Listen! If all must suffer to pay for the eternal harmony, what have children 
to do with it, tell me, please? It’s beyond all comprehension why they should 
suffer, and why they should pay for the harmony . . . Some jester will say, 
perhaps, that the child would have grown up and have sinned, but you see 
he didn’t grow up, he was torn to pieces by the dogs, at eight years old.39
I worry that, in offering this proposal on original sin, I may have become 
the “jester” who earns such acute scorn from the great novelist. There is, 
of course, this great difference: the jester is presenting the child’s counter-
factual sin as a theodicy, whereas I have not done so. Nor have I dimin-
ished the degree of the atrocity committed against the eight-year-old boy, 
offered any argument about the reality of hell, opined on the necessary 
conditions of salvation, or speculated on the child’s ultimate fate. But 
I have been suggesting that the boy may have been “truly morally respon-
sible” in such a way that he was deeply blameworthy, perhaps even—
in some ultimate sense—deserving of what he received, despite the fact 
that his suffering was senseless on every other level. Such is the price of 
acknowledging sin’s dominion over all of us.
Perhaps that is a bridge too far. But if it is a bridge too far, we will 
have learned something. We began this investigation with an attempt 
to offer an account of moral responsibility that neutralized the effects of 
luck, that put us—the moral agents ourselves—fully in the driver’s seat 
when it comes to how we are appraised in the eyes of God. With the aid 
of our Molinist metaphysic, we came to a conclusion according to which 
our responsibility is determined by all and only the facts about our will. 
But if the resulting consequences are too difficult to swallow—if being 
cut down in our youth can actually save us from the horror of finding 
ourselves deeply morally flawed in the eyes of God—then perhaps we are 
38I should note as an aside that the current suggestion on original sin is not committed 
to any particular soteriology. Some of the concerns about justice that provoke it might also 
prod us toward a kind of counterfactual approach to salvation, but that is a separate issue.
39Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, 226.
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conceding (or insisting!) that ultimate justice is a luck-sensitive affair after 
all, and that we can be more or less to blame because of things we do not 
control. But if we insist on a luck-free evaluation of agents, we may find 
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